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Abstract 
This conclusion places the main findings of the special issue in a wider theoretical context. First, it 
examines the types of impact on democratization processes that different religiously oriented parties 
have, highlighting how the progressive and the conservative types are more favourable to 
democratization. Conversely, the religious nationalist and the fundamentalist types have a more 
detrimental influence on democratization, although the latter can evolve into a conservative party 
under specific circumstances. Second, there is a critical re-examination of the moderation through 
inclusion thesis, whose validity is problematised. Finally, the conclusion deals with the issue of 
party change and evolution from one type to another, providing a typology that is fluid and allows 
for parties to move across categories. 
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Religiously oriented parties and democratization processes 
Despite suffering from significant criticism over the last decade or so, the democratization paradigm 
still holds considerable intellectual strength and provides very useful insights as to how processes of 
democratic change either succeed or fail. Most of the criticism laid at the door of the 
democratization paradigm has to do with its inbuilt teleology,1 but once it is accepted that 
numerous transitions do not necessarily lead to the promised land of liberal-democracy, other 
insights of the democratization paradigm can emerge to help both scholars and policy-makers make 
sense of how the whole process works. One of the most enduring and useful contributions of the 
democratization literature is the way in which scholars can examine transitions as games where 
different players compete and/or collaborate in order to arrive at their most preferred outcome.2 In 
this game, the actors have specific individual traits that inform their preferences, goals, and attitudes 
towards the process of democratic change. Political parties are among the most prominent actors in 
this game in so far as they aggregate individual preferences and through their activism they attempt 
to influence the direction of change. It is usually through their interactions, together with the 
choices of the security apparatus of the authoritarian regime, that the future institutions will be 
shaped rather than, for instance, through the dynamics of civil society activism.3 In this context, 
parties with a dubious or non-existent commitment to democracy and individual rights are 
problematic because their ideological rigidity can prevent compromise, thus derailing the transition. 
This is the case, according to critics, also of religiously oriented parties, that are often perceived as 
extremist and therefore inimical to democratization precisely because, as highlighted in the 
introduction to this special issue, they are specifically regarded as not fully committed to 
democracy, intransigently ideological, and aiming to produce public policies in accordance with a 
religious view of society in an inherently illiberal conception of law-making.4 Although this can be 
true in cases involving extremist fundamentalist parties, several case study analyses have proved 
that religiously oriented parties fully accepting of democratic pluralism can play a role in both 
processes of democratic instauration and consolidation. 
However, a thorough comparative and systematic assessment of the role played by religiously 
oriented parties in democratization processes is largely absent in the literature, in part because 
religion and democratization never really meshed as recognized recently by Stepan and Linz.5 To 
begin with, the broader field of studying the role played by religious actors in democratization 
processes is very recent.6 In addition, existing works of religious actors and democratization have 
so far taken into account mostly social actors active in civil society, rather than political ones 
working in the political system. Thus, an examination of the latter's role in democratization 
processes is absent. In this special issue we fill, in part, this gap through the concept of religiously 
oriented parties. More specifically, we offer a categorization of religiously oriented parties and their 
diverse attitudes, whether ideological or organizational, towards democratic values and institutions. 
The overarching objective of this special issue has been to provide analysts with the nuance 
necessary to examine the relationship with democracy and democratization according to the specific 
category a party belongs to. This conclusion summarizes the findings proposed by the different 
contributions in relation to this. On the one hand, therefore, it assesses the role played by the 
different party types, as defined by Ozzano's contribution, in the different phases of democratization 
processes.7 On the other hand, assuming that some party types are more favourable than others to 
the instauration and the consolidation of a democratic system, it takes into account the issue of party 
change, evaluating the possibilities that parties can alter their identity, switching from one type to 
another, and thus changing their impact on democracy. 
 
Party types and their influence on democratization 
The introduction to this special issue and Ozzano's contribution more specifically put forward the 
hypothesis that different types of religiously oriented parties can have a different impact on 
democratization processes, both in newly democratizing countries and in more stable democracies 
where consolidation is the name of the game. This is an idea that is also found elsewhere, but 
mainly in terms of distinction between parties with a pluralistic and a proto-hegemonic worldview8; 
or, in other words, between parties accepting to change their identity, and parties only tactically 
engaging in democratic politics in order to get to power.9 This special issue proposed instead a 
more nuanced typology, which takes into account a greater number of features of political parties, 
such as their organization and their relations with interest groups. The outcome is a five-category 
typology, including the conservative, the progressive, the fundamentalist, the religious nationalist, 
and the camp types. 
To begin with, Ozzano's contribution puts forward the idea that the progressive type of a religiously 
oriented party is potentially the more pro-democratic, since it is supposed not only to 
enthusiastically accept democratic pluralism, but also to promote reconciliation and harmony. Both 
characteristics are relevant for the democratization of the domestic political and social system. This 
hypothesis seems to be confirmed by Luna, Monestier, and Rosenblatt's contribution on Chile.10 In 
that case, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was indeed crucial in enhancing social harmony, 
and in allowing the formation of broad coalition governments after the end of Pinochet's regime in 
order to contribute to the consolidation of Chilean democracy. This role was made possible by the 
peculiar identity of the party, mixing religious values and social progressive orientation, which 
allowed it to bridge the gap between the Christian world and the leftist and Marxist forces. 
According to the authors this positive role has been also made possible by the evolution of the 
position of the Catholic Church – and more broadly the Catholic world – in the second half of the 
twentieth century in relation to the issue of both democratic pluralism and social equality. In this 
respect the broader point is that scholars should be aware of the theological debates that affect 
religious traditions because they do have implications for social and political actors that find 
legitimacy in that tradition. In addition, in the Chilean case, a more general secularization of 
society, which allows Christian political parties to take rather secular stances on several issues, 
contributed to the party's positive role in democratization. The consequent dispersion of religious 
votes across a number of different parties is therefore linked to increased pluralization and increases 
the chances of democratic consolidation through the progressive marginalization of the 
religious/secular cleavage as the most significant one in society. 
Giorgi's contribution about Italy largely confirms these findings.11 In the Italian case, the growing 
secularization of society and the increasing pluralization of the Catholic world – together with other 
factors, such as the end of the Cold War and a new electoral law – renders the re-creation of a single 
Catholic party – as in the case of Christian Democracy (DC) – impossible. As a consequence, 
Italian democratic renewal since the mid-1990s has become more pluralistic, with a much greater 
number of political parties alternating in power in sharp contrast to the period between 1948 and 
1994. The impossibility of a large Catholic party gathering the entire Catholic vote to occupy the 
political centre and therefore to prevent political alternation for a long time has paradoxically 
enlarged significantly the policy options available to parties in power. Thus, the progressive 
Catholic forces previously included in the DC or simply active in civil society have been able to 
create new parties allied with post-communist forces. Conversely, the more conservative Catholic 
strands have created parties or movements that have allied with centre-right parties. This situation, 
with Catholics distributed between the centre-right, the centre-left, and the centre, has also 
prevented any political side from exclusively representing religious values, thus reducing 
polarization along a religious/secular cleavage. This suggests that religious values, rather than 
disappearing, become contested in terms of their relative importance and emphasis. As already 
explained in Ozzano's contribution, the progressive is the less frequent type of religiously oriented 
party, and it is not present in other cases, except in some factions of the Northern Irish case 
described in O'Malley and Walsh's contribution.12 In this case, some of the Christian progressive 
factions have successfully engaged in the region's consociational system, although their positive 
impact has been partially hindered by a nationalist orientation and by the ethnic foundations of 
Ulster's political system. The case of Northern Ireland is particularly significant because it provides 
a warning to scholars looking at how religiously oriented parties and movements might be affecting 
democratization in so far as they might be overemphasizing the religious element and neglecting the 
nationalist one when the two can probably be disentangled and where the latter might be more 
dominant. 
The conservative case is also highlighted by Ozzano as potentially pro-democratic. This is in part 
due to its guarded but favourable attitude to pluralism and in part to its catch-all nature. The 
conservative type is usually connected to a wide and varied associational network, and open to 
access by different kinds of interest groups, thus contributing to prevent the “perils of polarization”. 
In Tepe's contribution this element partially emerges in the analysis of the electorate of the 
religiously oriented conservative parties.13 Tepe also highlights that an important distinction has to 
be drawn between the elites' attitudes, and those of their constituencies. Studies of political parties 
and the majority of studies of democratization are traditionally concerned with the attitudes, 
stances, and strategizing of the party elites, but insufficient attention has been paid to the attitudes 
of the ordinary individuals within the party or sympathetic to it. More focus on the individual level 
and how this informs polarization is therefore necessary to outline what role the party plays in 
processes of democratization or democratic consolidation. For instance, according to Tepe, despite 
the pro-democratic attitude of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP), its constituency 
does not show a profile radically different from that of other parties belonging to the religious 
nationalist and fundamentalist types. This might be particularly true in consolidating democracies 
such as Turkey, but surely deserves more investigation, as does the tendency of this party type to 
occupy the centre, which can prevent political alternation. Specifically, it is not yet clear, in cases 
such as Italy, if the substitution of a wide conservative party occupying the centre – but marked by a 
strong internal dialectic process and factionalism – with several progressive and conservative 
parties on both sides of the left-right divide is actually positive in terms of democratization. The 
positive role that can be played by the conservative party type in the consolidation of a newly 
democratized country is also shown by Chile's Independent Democratic Union (UDI), described by 
Luna, Monestier, and Rosenblatt, while the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) represents today, 
according to O'Malley and Walsh, a cornerstone of Ulster's consociational system.14  
As for the fundamentalist party type, Ozzano's contribution clarifies that it has a negative impact on 
democratization in the absence of a trajectory of moderation that can orient it towards the 
conservative type. This finding confirms the conclusions of most of the literature – the 
fundamentalist type is the subject of most of the existing works – where the incompatibility of this 
party type with democratic values and institutions is pretty well established.15 The most striking 
feature of this special issue in relation to the fundamentalist party type is, indeed, its virtual absence 
or political marginality wherever democracy consolidates. In some cases, as described above, such 
forces turn into other party models; in others, such as those of Israel's Kach and several Islamist 
Turkish parties in the past decades, they are banned. In other cases still they only exist as fringe 
parties, barely influential on the wider political debate and often unable even to enter parliament, as 
in the case of Turkey's Prosperity Party, dealt with in Tepe's contribution. 
On the contrary, the religious nationalist party type is alive and well. A number of contributions in 
this special issue testify to the vitality and importance of this party type. As described in the next 
section of this conclusion, this is probably connected both to the persistence of traditional ethno-
cultural cleavages in several political systems and to the problems encountered by such parties in 
their path towards moderation because of their linkages to social movements that have maintained 
rather extremist views, which can prevent, as shown by Jaffrelot in the case of India's Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP), their transformation into another party model.16 As highlighted by the author, 
the presence in India's political system of a wide religious nationalist party with a problematic 
attitude towards social pluralism and with strong ties to an extremist grassroots network has proven 
to be a negative factor for both the democratic stability and the social harmony of the country. 
Specifically, Jaffrelot highlights the oscillation of the party between phases of moderation during 
which it showed features of a catch-all conservative party and others of extremism and grassroots 
activism. While the former have enhanced democratization by facilitating coalition-building 
processes, also including parties with different ideological orientations and ethno-religious bases, 
the latter have engendered contentious and often violent events, with a negative impact on India's 
democratic stability. 
As shown by Tepe's contribution, if an evolutionary trajectory is detectable in the case of the 
religious nationalist party type, it is not towards moderation, but rather towards more radical 
stances.17 According to the data the author provides, in both the Israeli and the Turkish case, we 
can find an extremization of the religious constituency that has moved largely towards the right of 
the political spectrum with negative consequences for both countries' polarization levels. Coalition 
politics also seems not to have had a moderating effect on Italy's Northern League, which during the 
2000s, as indicated by Giorgi's contribution,18 increased its pro-religious orientation by actively 
engaging in “culture wars” on a number of religious and ethical issues and thus engendering, in 
turn, polarization processes in the Italian political system. In the Italian case, however, this was 
mitigated by the presence of Catholic forces in all the major coalitions. In any case, as shown in 
many contributions in this special issue, the religious nationalist party type rather than the 
fundamentalist one seems indeed to be the only religiously oriented party type with a negative 
attitude towards pluralism capable of thriving also in established democracies. 
Finally, the contributions of this special issue show that the camp party type is quite rare and typical 
of contexts – such as Israel and Ulster – where deep and unresolved cleavages prevented the 
creation of a civil society – and a political constituency – with some core shared values. However, 
both cases also show that the impact of such parties on democratization is not necessarily negative, 
since – in order to pursue the interests of the communities they represent – they can take part in 
consociational agreements and, in the case of Israel, also participate in governments with left-wing 
forces. As highlighted by Tepe's contribution, the major problem in this case is probably the tunnel 
vision that such a narrow-minded party model can engender in its base, thus hindering its political 
socialization and its opening up towards wider society.19  
 
Party types transformations and trajectories 
As already highlighted above, the possibility of party change seems to be a crucial factor in relation 
to the role played by religiously oriented actors in democratization processes. The fact that all 
contributors used the typology Ozzano designed in his article enables us to provide a much clearer 
picture of the dynamics that such parties engender in processes of regime change away from 
anecdotal evidence. In addition, the categories that Ozzano offers and the findings in the 
contributions offer powerful insights into the relationship between the political moderation of 
religiously oriented parties and democracy and democratization. The categories in Ozzano's 
analytical framework, as mentioned earlier, are not watertight, fixed, and exclusive, but are 
constructed with the implicit assumption that over time parties might and do move from one 
category to another. In some cases this move might be synonymous with moderation (acceptance of 
democratic mechanisms, social pluralism, and individual rights), in others it can lead instead to 
further radicalization, and/or to an accentuation of a nationalist identity, or even lead to cyclical 
patterns, as shown by the BJP case in India. Most of the contributions to this special issue deal with 
such dynamics with a specific focus on the mechanisms that might lead parties to choose the path of 
political moderation, meaning the acceptance of democracy, social pluralism, and individual rights. 
Political moderation, and in particular the “twin tolerations”20 between democracy and religion, is 
an important asset for democratization and enhanced democratic stability and it is therefore 
incumbent upon scholars to analyse the ways in which it might come about or, alternatively, how it 
is prevented. A number of interesting and at times surprising findings emerge. 
First, the moderation through inclusion thesis, dominant in the literature, does not find much 
confirmation in some of the cases examined. In the Tunisian case, we find that the moderation of 
the Islamist party and its “move” from the fundamentalist type to the conservative one has largely 
occurred because of exclusion rather than inclusion. Both repression from the authoritarian regime, 
but more significantly, the shunning of large sectors of society and other opposition parties forced 
the Islamist party to go through a process of internal ideological renewal that culminated in its 
moderation and subsequent inclusion in the pro-democracy front. In some ways this finding runs 
contrary to the idea that progressive inclusion into the political system or in cross-ideological 
alliances brings moderation about and, interestingly, it suggests that marginalizing an extremist 
actor does not necessarily lead to its radicalization. Quite the opposite can actually occur. In terms 
of the wider debate on democratization, it suggests that not all political movements and forces 
should be afforded a chance to participate in the construction of a new political system if specific 
democratic engagements are not undertaken. Haqqani recently sounded a similar note of warning 
when discussing the relationship between Islamist parties and democracy in Pakistan.21 The 
moderation through inclusion thesis comes under question in the Indian case as well in so far as 
Hindu nationalist parties have not moderated entirely despite their long inclusion in the democratic 
political system of India. Whereas the finding in itself is not entirely surprising given the inability 
of these parties to completely detach themselves from the extremist social movements they were 
generated from, it is surprising in so far as this absence of moderation has not resulted in the 
collapse of Indian democracy. While India might have consolidated more strongly had the 
moderation of such parties occurred, authoritarian regression has been largely avoided. In terms of 
the wider debate on democratization this suggests that the strength of democratic institutions can be 
found outside institutional politics or in institutions other than political parties. 
Second, the absence of political moderation of a religious nationalist type party vis-à-vis a 
competing one which is the expression of a different and opposing religious community does not 
necessarily prevent the emergence of collaborative agreements. The case of Northern Ireland is 
particularly important in this respect because it suggests that the construction of consociational 
democratic agreements can take place in fact only when strong religious nationalist parties from 
opposite sides strike a deal: which, paradoxically, marginalizes the moderate factions within each 
camp. In terms of democratization this might suggest that there are specific conditions that allow for 
agreements between extremist parties, but this can only in fact occur, as in the case of Northern 
Ireland, when the nationalist element seems stronger than the religious one as O'Malley and Walsh 
suggest.22 The case of Israel provides a corollary to this, in the sense that religious nationalist 
parties can contribute to the stabilization of democratic structures through participation in 
government coalitions. While this may marginalize citizens of different religious communities – in 
this case Christian and Muslim Palestinians – the stability of democratic mechanisms is ensured 
precisely because there is a nationalist shared element – Zionism – that has more overarching 
relevance than the purely religious one. In short, Jewish religiously oriented nationalist parties in 
Israel can overcome the religious/religious cleavage and form coalitions with secular parties 
because the nationalist ideology of Zionism is stronger. 
Third, the special issue strongly indicates that the issue of polarization and political moderation is 
not only about parties. Constituencies of reference have a considerable importance in two ways. On 
the one hand, party elites might be more committed and divisive than their constituents. In this case, 
democratization and democratic stability might not be in danger because constituents at the 
individual level are capable and willing to build cross-ideological bridges across cleavages in their 
everyday interactions. On the other hand, constituents might be more divisive and/or ideologically 
sectarian than party elites. This is an issue that Tepe emphasizes in her contribution about Israel and 
Turkey – where, according to her findings, the stances of the constituencies of parties such as the 
AKP might be more extremist than those of their leadership – and that Jaffrelot also stresses in his 
contribution about India's BJP, forced into a cyclical oscillation between moderate and extremist 
phases by its ties to a strong social movement.23 In these cases democratic stability and 
democratization can be in danger because party elites, despite their more moderate views, might 
have to “go after” the more extremist views of the constituents to remain politically relevant. 
Such findings, both in terms of parties' trajectories of change and in terms of their influence on 
democratization processes, are a first systematic attempt to examine the role of religiously oriented 
parties in relation to democratization and democratic stability. This work thus hopes to begin a new 
line of inquiry that has tremendous relevance for today's politics throughout the world. 
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